For months, Israel ignores permit application by a Gaza resident to visit his sick father, then denies it. The grounds: The bed-ridden father’s condition is not severe enough to justify a visit from his son
March 4, 2019. On November 11, 2018, Gisha filed a High Court petition (Hebrew) on behalf of Shadi Ramadan, a resident of Gaza who wants to visit his ailing father in the West Bank. The father was hospitalized in June 2018 after suffering a stroke. A few days later, Shadi filed a permit application to visit him under Israel’s criterion for visiting sick first-degree relatives. According to Israel’s procedures, the relative’s medical condition must be one that presents “a threat to the life of the patient, or requires prolonged hospitalization.”
Shadi’s application was left pending for two months, without any response from the Gaza Civil Liaison Administration (CLA), the Israeli authority charged with processing all permit applications by Gaza residents. Gisha intervened on Shadi’s behalf to request that his application be processed urgently, by which time his father had been released from hospital, and was being cared for around-the-clock by his wife. The Gaza CLA responded by denying Shadi’s application, stating (Hebrew) that it failed to meet the necessary criteria because the father’s condition was not severe enough to justify granting his son a permit. Gisha sent a letter (Hebrew) to the CLA objecting to this decision . The CLA responded (Hebrew) by changing its reasoning for the denial of Shadi’s permit, claiming suddenly that Shadi was blocked for “security reasons,” precluding him from travel altogether.
At this juncture, Gisha filed a petition on Shadi’s behalf, following which, he was summoned to Erez Crossing for security questioning by the Israel Security Agency (ISA). Unsurprisingly, the ISA removed the “security block” following the interview, but the allegation that the father was not sick ‘enough’ resurfaced.
On December 3, 2018, the High Court heard Gisha’s petition. The justices refused to consider the fact that Shadi’s application was ignored for two months, focusing instead on possible interpretations of the criterion for visiting a “sick relative.” The justices expressed the opinion that a situation in which a patient requires constant care should be considered as “hospitalization” even if the bed-ridden patient is at home rather than in the hospital. This comment is immensely important given the Gaza CLA’s increasingly tendency to interpret the criterion literally, meaning that only people whose first-degree relatives are actually hospitalized due to a life-threatening condition can apply for travel permits to visit them (in other words, under this strict reading, even fewer people would meet Israel’s already narrow criteria for submitting permit applications to visit ill relatives).
The court suggested that the petitioner should provide updated medical documents focusing on the father’s need for constant care, and that the petition should be withdrawn. The justices refused to give any weight to the fact that the only reason that the medical documents Shadi had already provided were outdated was that his permit application had not been processed by the respondents within an appropriate timeframe. The petition was deleted (Hebrew).
On January 8, 2019, Gisha provided (Hebrew) the State Attorney’s Office with three medical reports concerning the Shadi’s father’s condition, as well as an expert medical opinion (Hebrew) from an Israeli physician noting that according to the assessment of the father’s physician, the father’s mobility had been seriously impaired to the point where he was fully dependent on the people around him. Gisha also reminded the State Attorney that at court, the state had expressed willingness to consider Shadi’s application under the criterion for visiting a sick relative, even though his father was being cared for at home, rather than in a hospital.
On January 21, 2019, the Gaza CLA responded (Hebrew) by again denying Shadi’s application on the grounds that it still did not meet the criteria, partly because the documents provided did not indicate that the father required medical monitoring or support from a medical team at home. It goes without saying that none of these requirements had been presented before the court during the initial hearing. In its response, the state portrayed the father’s complete and well-documented dependence on constant care from the people around him as “evidence of some dependence.”
Given the circumstances, on January 31, 2019, Gisha was forced to file a second petition (Hebrew) on behalf of Shadi, who was naturally growing increasingly anxious to see his ailing father. This petition was filed with the Jerusalem District Court, sitting as a court of administrative affairs, because of an amendment to the national law on court authorities introduced in late 2018. In the petition, we argued that the respondents had not considered Shadi’s application in keeping with the remarks made by the High Court during the hearing on the initial petition. We explained that the literal interpretation of the criteria by the respondents was arbitrary and unreasonable. We also presented examples of other cases in which the respondents had approved permits for visits to ill relatives in similar medical circumstances to that of Shadi’s father, including cases in which the individuals had been released from hospital.
The petition was heard on March 3, 2019, after which the justices dismissed (Hebrew) the petition, upholding the respondents’ decision to deny Shadi’s application. The court ruled that although there was no dispute that the father had fallen seriously ill, the medical documents provided did not indicate that the father’s life was in danger or that lengthy hospitalization was required in his case; that although the documents indicated that the father requires constant care and depends on others, this did not imply a need for lengthy hospitalization. The court also noted that the medical documents had not been prepared according to proper legal protocol, as the letter from the Israeli physician was not based on her own medical examination of the father.
The main difficulty arising from the judgment is the Jerusalem District Court’s apparent reluctance to address the interpretation of the phrase “requiring hospitalization,” despite the path that had been laid out in the opinion expressed by the High Court justices on the first petition. The reasons that the state had provided for denying Shadi’s application were not examined. In fact, the court did not exercise any judicial scrutiny with respect to the state’s position.
We believe that the judgment given in this case is mistaken and are preparing to launch an appeal in the near future.
To read Amira Hass’ article in Haaretz about Shadi’s story, see here.
